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Abstract There have been calls for some time for a new approach to public 
health in the United Kingdom and beyond. This is consequent on the recognition 
and acceptance that health problems often have a complex and multi-faceted aetiol-
ogy. At the same time, policies which utilise insights from research in behavioural 
economics and psychology (‘behavioural science’) have gained prominence on the 
political agenda. The relationship between the social determinants of health (SDoH) 
and behavioural science in health policy has not hitherto been explored. Given the 
on-going presence of strategies based on findings from behavioural science in pol-
icy-making on the political agenda, an examination of this is warranted. This paper 
begins by looking at the place of the SDoH within public health, before outlining, 
in brief, the recent drive towards utilising behavioural science to formulate law and 
public policy. We then examine the relationship between this and the SDoH. We 
argue that behavioural public health policy is, to a certain extent, blind to the social 
and other determinants of health. In section three, we examine ways in which such 
policies may perpetuate and/or exacerbate health inequities and social injustices. We 
argue that problems in this respect may be compounded by assumptions and prac-
tices which are built into some behavioural science methodologies. We also argue 
that incremental individual gains may not be enough. As such, population-level 
measures are sometimes necessary. In section four we defend this contention, argu-
ing that an equitable and justifiable public health requires such measures.
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Introduction
There have been calls for some time for a new approach to public health in the 
United Kingdom and beyond. This is consequent on the recognition and acceptance 
that health problems often have a complex and multi-faceted aetiology [42, 74]. In 
particular, there is evidence that a range of social and other factors influence indi-
vidual health outcomes. These include early health status, educational attainment, 
employment (or lack thereof), working conditions, and income level [42]. This has, 
in turn, been acknowledged in a variety of Government reports [23, 35, 42]. At the 
same time, policies which utilise insights from research in behavioural economics 
and psychology (henceforth ‘behavioural science’1) have gained prominence on the 
political agenda, including those insights which purport to help people make deci-
sions which are better for their health. This research broadly concludes that we make 
certain predictable and systematic errors in judgement. Our choices and decisions 
are affected by our reliance upon a range of cognitive biases and heuristics. For 
instance, some research shows that the way information is presented to us influences 
the way we choose (framing effect), we tend to show undue confidence regarding 
the probability that events will or will not occur (optimism bias), and we do not tend 
to deviate from default options which are presented to us (status quo bias).2 The 
principal message to be taken from behavioural science research is that contextual 
influences (sometimes called choice architecture [73]) affect the decisions we make. 
By taking account of these, government and regulators can thus attempt to alter the 
health behaviour of citizens through approaches which harness or eliminate our cog-
nitive quirks.
The relationship between the social determinants of health (SDoH) and behav-
ioural science in health policy has not hitherto been explored. Given the on-going 
presence of strategies based on findings from behavioural science in policy-mak-
ing on the political agenda (nationally and internationally [18]), an examination of 
this is warranted. Making explicit the connections or (as it turns out) lack thereof 
between these two areas highlights potential problems with the use of the behav-
ioural sciences in public health policy. To this end, we begin in the next section by 
looking at the place of the SDoH within public health, before outlining, in brief, 
the recent drive towards utilising behavioural science to formulate law and public 
1 We recognise that the behavioural sciences do and ought to include much more than this (e.g. the 
behavioural-focused social sciences), but often when the term is used in the types of policies and lit-
erature we refer to, it is used to mean these behavioural economics and cognitive psychology. Thus our 
intention in following this is not to create a behavioural straw-person argument, but to make clear that the 
target of our critique is a particular framing of the research and issues.
2 However, note that some of this is contested. As we will see in “(In)equality and Social (In)justice 
I: Methodological and Empirical Concerns” section, Gigerenzer demonstrates that proponents of these 
kinds of approaches to law and policy take a selective reading of the evidence.
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policy. We then examine the relationship between this and the SDoH. Our argument 
here is that new behavioural public health policy is, to a certain extent, blind to the 
social and other determinants of health. Suggested and actual applications of the 
behavioural sciences in health policy have mainly targeted a group of issues that 
have become the usual public health suspects (smoking, diet, alcohol intake, and 
physical activity). This, we suggest, is problematic. Without adequate consideration 
of the wider social and other contexts of health, this could have important equity and 
justice implications. Thus, in “(In)equality and Social (In)justice I: Methodologi-
cal and Empirical Concerns” section, we examine ways in which such policies may 
perpetuate and/or exacerbate health inequities and social injustices. We argue that 
problems in this respect may be compounded by assumptions and practices which 
are built into some behavioural science methodologies. Here we also argue that the 
incremental individual gains, which some behavioural science interventions bring 
about, may not be enough. As such, population-level measures are sometimes neces-
sary. In “(In)equality and Social (In)justice II: What Kind of public Health?” sec-




Between the 1970s and 1990s, researchers began examining the ‘causes of the 
causes’ of poor health. They were interested in the social conditions that give rise 
to a higher risk of non-communicable disease in some groups, and studied the dif-
ferences in mortality rates in British civil servants. In particular, Marmot and Rose’s 
Whitehall studies provided evidence that the relationship between poverty and 
health may not be characterised by a threshold, but by a gradient. It is not the case, 
they found, that achieving a certain socio-economic status is sufficient to achieve 
good health. Instead, throughout class ranks each group does better in health than 
the one below [50, 51]. Marmot and Rose theorised that these disparities in health 
were caused by a combination of unhealthy behaviours and the effects of impos-
sibly stressful lives [42, 51, 69]. The ‘social determinants’, as they became known, 
include factors like housing and living environment, exposure to environmental pol-
lutants, educational attainment, food quality and availability, and many other fac-
tors that impact our health, outside of genetic predispositions or accidental illness or 
injury. Since the 1990s, a growing amount of research has confirmed the observation 
that those with greater economic and social resources are more likely to have better 
health outcomes insofar as they may do better regarding the social determinants, 
resulting in predictable disparities in health between groups [13, 19, 32, 41, 63].
Despite this research, establishing causation between socio-economic status and 
health outcomes has been difficult because of the various complex, and often cov-
ert, ways in which determinants like housing, employment, transportation, educa-
tional attainment, childcare, food provision, and a variety of other factors have a 
cumulative impact upon health over time. As such, teasing out and analysing the 
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multiplicity of covariates has proved challenging. However, researchers continue to 
find correlations between poor health and low socioeconomic status. For example, 
a recent analysis of active transportation among school-age children in California 
found an unexpected positive relation between using active transit to get to school 
and having obesity. The researchers proposed that the link between these factors may 
be poverty: children who are poor are both more likely to bike or walk to school and 
also to be obese [17]. As such, public health’s messaging to groups with higher rates 
of obesity to be more active may miss the audience, and the point. Other research-
ers in the US have found that racial and economic disparities lead to worse health 
outcomes and higher obesity rates [2, 17, 79]. Some commentators have noted that 
results like these reveal a blind spot in the public health policy literature. While pub-
lic health researchers seem to have reached a consensus that low socioeconomic sta-
tus begets poor health, many of the policy reports in public health continue to call 
for individual changes, not the mitigation of social determinants connected to pov-
erty, or the regulation of various social systems (such as the food provision system) 
[17, 68].
Amongst the reports which emphasise individual changes are those which 
propose policy influenced by behavioural science. Although behaviour-change 
approaches are not new, behavioural science-influenced strategies have come to 
the political fore in recent times. The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) in the UK, 
established in 2010, leads the way in this regard. Sometimes called the ‘nudge unit’, 
BIT originally started within the Cabinet Office, before separating out and becoming 
a public–private partnership with both the Cabinet Office and the National Endow-
ment for Science, Technology, and the Arts [7]. The influence of the UK-based team 
spread internationally. Members of the BIT went on to advise the New South Wales 
Office of Premier and Cabinet in Australia on a range of policy measures. That 
Office now has its own team [24]. Following this, in 2015 the Australian Govern-
ment created a Federal level unit [25]. In the US, under the Obama administration, 
the White House set up the Social and Behavioural Sciences Team (SBST). This 
team was created with the aim of translating “findings and methods from the social 
and behavioral sciences into improvements in Federal policies and programs” [71], 
which was subsequently specified in an Executive order [56]. The fate of the SBST 
under the current administration is yet uncertain (but appears safe). Across Europe, 
several countries also have dedicated behavioural teams within Government or are 
explicitly using behavioural science research to inform policy-making; for instance, 
the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark [28]. Moreover, at European Commission 
level, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) provides support for behavioural research in 
Commission service areas [27].
Both the BIT and the European Commission’s JRC have produced reports which 
encompass a range of policy areas, including the application of behavioural science to 
health [4, 5, 37, 76]. To highlight the kinds of interventions being trialed and imple-
mented, and the findings from behavioural science which inform them, consider some 
measures in relation to smoking. In the UK and Iceland, it is illegal to openly display 
tobacco products, and in the UK, Ireland and France, plain packaging regulations are 
in force. In the UK, this legislation came into force in May 2017, following an unsuc-
cessful legal challenge by the tobacco industry [26]. Draft plain packaging regulations 
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are also being considered in a number of other European countries [28]. Both restric-
tions on display and plain packaging initiatives aim to decrease the visibility and social 
acceptability of tobacco products. The way these measures work is two-fold. First, the 
visual cues which can trigger consumption are reduced by restricting displays. Sec-
ond, the power of social norms is harnessed. By hiding the products and removing 
‘attractive’ and branded packaging, these measures send a message that smoking is 
not socially acceptable. Although these initiatives involve legislation, the behaviour of 
individual citizens is not being directly regulated. Whilst it may be illegal for shops to 
display tobacco products, it is not illegal to smoke, and the committed smoker can still 
buy cigarettes. There is no ban on tobacco products, or their purchase or sale. It is for 
this reason that strategies such as these, which alter the choice environment, are some-
times labelled ‘nudges’ or ‘libertarian paternalism’ [59, 73].
Consider also food and diet. In a recent BIT report on health, suggestions relating 
to food include decreasing the size of food packaging and tableware, and changing 
the placement of healthy foods in shops to make them more accessible (conversely 
one could make ‘unhealthy’ foods less accessible) [73]. Such suggestions draw 
on research which points to the biases and other factors which affect eating. For 
instance, ‘present bias’ means that we give more weight to our present desires, and 
tend to discount our future or longer-term goals. This can manifest through under-
valuing the longer-term disadvantages of unhealthy diet or of skipping exercise, and 
overvaluing the immediate benefits of food experiences. The benefits of hyper-pal-
atable food (food that is created to be very high in salt, sugar, and fat) to us now is 
more salient than any longer-term disadvantages it may have. As such, we might 
favour high-convenience food in the present, seeking to impose greater self-control 
on our future selves. We tell ourselves ‘I’ll eat better tomorrow’, something which 
may not materialise [46]. In addition to present bias, things like menu layout in res-
taurants, as well as portion sizes can affect what we choose and how much we eat 
[46]. Rather than placing regulations around the added ingredients in hyper-palata-
ble food, policies informed by behavioural science often suggest changing the deci-
sion environment; for example, calorie-postings on menu boards, changing the size 
of plates at self-serve food outlets, or rearranging food displays.3 These are individ-
ual-focused initiatives, which operate on a one-person-at-a-time basis, and thus, the 
success of these measures to change eating behaviours are highly variable between 
people. In “(In)equality and Social (In)justice II: What Kind of public Health?” sec-
tion, we will discuss a regulation in the food system which is not individual-focused, 
and which has great public health potential.
3 Recently, the BIT has claimed regulations as ‘behavioural’, when, as we argue later in the paper, they 
are in fact not behavioural, but rather, old-fashioned legislative measures. For example, the UK is con-
sidering implementing a sugar-reduction strategy in April of 2018 that would place soft drinks (among 
other products) into different tax categories depending added sugar content. The goal of the policy seems 
to be to have companies change the formulation of their products, to lower the amount of sugar people 
consume without changing consumers’ behaviour. We argue that this is not a behavioural intervention, 
but regulation simpliciter, with higher taxation as a penalty to noncompliant companies. This piece of 
old-fashioned regulation appears to be working, and we have critiqued behavioural scientists for claiming 
too much for themselves by framing this as a behavioural intervention. We briefly say more about this 
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Ships in the Night?
The drive to utilise behavioural science in (public) health policy has thus far taken 
little account of macro-level social determinants. Take, for example, three promi-
nent policy reports: (1) the 2010 Behavioural Insights Team’s Applying Behavioural 
Insight to Health [4]; (2) the European Commission Joint Research Centre’s (JRC) 
2013 ‘Applying Behavioural Sciences to EU Policy-making’ [75]; and (3) the JRC’s 
most recent ‘Behavioural Insights Applied to Policy European Report 2016’ [47]. The 
BIT report is exclusively focused on health. The other two are more broadly focused, 
but they mention health and health-related interventions to varying degrees. As can be 
seen from examples given in the previous section, the usual public health suspects are 
a prevalent focus in policy reports drawing on research in behavioural science. Smok-
ing, alcohol, diet, and physical activity take up the greater part of health issues dis-
cussed across all three reports. The 2010 BIT report discusses other topics, examining 
organ donation, teenage pregnancy, diabetes control and compliance, and food hygiene 
[4]. Nevertheless, we can see that this list does not include the ‘social, material, politi-
cal and cultural inequalities’ which constitute the macro determinants of health status 
and outcomes. The 2016 BIT report on health reaffirms this ‘lifestyle’ focus, saying:
… Around half of the global burden of disease arises from behavioral and life-
style factors. Unhealthy eating, smoking and alcohol consumption contribute 
to the development of long-term conditions such as diabetes; cardiovascular 
diseases; chronic respiratory diseases; and musculoskeletal disorders [37].
Yet, despite the report noting that we need to better understand the “ways that ill-
health develops” and “why unhealthy behaviours happen” [37], it contains no 
engagement with issues regarding the social determinants of health.
The academic literature does not fare much better. The two areas—behavioural 
science and the social determinants of health—currently occupy two almost separate 
spheres of academic debate. While some articles mention these together, there is not 
generally any substantive discussion of the relationship (or potential relationship) 
between them.4 From the behavioural sciences side of things, some articles include 
4 A literature review was conducted to discover the extent to which behavioural science-inspired/nudge-
type interventions were being discussed, recommended, or critiqued in connection with the social deter-
minants of health. A search was conducted using journal databases (JStor, SSRN, Google Scholar) and 
then within specific journal archives (Journal of Economic Psychology, Journal of Socio-Economics 
(now the Journal of Behavioural and Experimental Economics), Journal of Public Policy, Journal of Pub-
lic Health, Public Health Ethics, Public Health Reports), using keyword combinations. The keywords on 
the right were matched with all of the keywords on the left in their possible combinations. The results 
from these searches were combed for articles that contained both sets of keywords, and that addressed 
the social determinants of health (SDoH) as a central feature of the article. These keyword combinations 
were:
Public health Behavioural science
Health Behavioural economics
Determinants of health Nudges/nudging
Social determinants of health Libertarian paternalism
Social determinants Choice architecture
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references to social determinants, while not actually being about them. For example, 
Glanz and Bishop state in the abstract to their paper that “influential contemporary 
perspectives stress the multiple determinants and multiple levels of determinants 
of health and health behaviour” [33]. They write that public health and health pro-
motion initiatives will be most effective if they are based on an ecological under-
standing of health behaviours, which are attentive to the social and political envi-
ronment a person has to operate within. However, it becomes clear that Glanz and 
Bishop, like other commentators, find choice architecture to be a sufficiently eco-
logical approach. They provide an overview of the theories of behavioural science 
as they apply to health promotion, and then claim that the most prominent contribu-
tors to death and disease in the US and globally are individual behavioural factors 
[33]. Thus, while their piece initially appears to engage with the SDoH, the focus 
on behavioural factors and choice architecture actually leads to their exclusion [33, 
44, 68]. Others, such as Roberto and Kawachi, fare slightly better, offering a brief 
consideration of how behavioural strategies could complement other “long-term and 
structural barriers to achieving optimal health in people’s lives” [64]. Here there is 
a broad acknowledgement that wider factors are determinative of a person’s health. 
But again there is no in-depth engagement with this and with the (potential) rela-
tionship with behavioural science-inspired approaches.
Those articles and documents which approach the issue from a public health 
or SDoH perspective engage with behavioural science in a more substantive fash-
ion than vice versa. However, this engagement is critical in nature. The criticism 
of behavioural science from within public health is exemplified by a recent WHO 
report that suggests that a focus on individual behaviours and nudges contribute to 
the failure to address health equity and the social determinants of health in Europe. 
The report noted that WHO studies found a tendency “to focus on intermediate or 
proximal determinants such as access to health services, lifestyle or behaviour, liv-
ing conditions (housing, water and sanitation) and social cohesion” [80]. This focus 
was symptomatic of a failure to properly conceptualise the multiple factors involved 
in the health of a population, and to “intervene with the magnitude and intensity 
necessary to affect their distribution” [80]. The proposed reasons for this echo the 
Marmot Working Committee’s findings outlined earlier; that is, the tendency to 
focus on proximal issues affecting health is influenced by many factors, including 
political ideology and the interests of different stakeholders5 [80]. The WHO report 
notes that part of this “includes a resurgence of the trickle-down effect and a focus 
on individual responsibilities and behaviour change, such as ‘nudge’ strategies” 
[80]. Taken in the broader context of the report, this represents a clear statement that 
the WHO does not think that nudge-type interventions from behavioural science can 
address significant health concerns, health equity, or the fundamental social deter-
minants of health.
Similar critiques can also be found in other places. For instance, Rayner and Lang 
argue that behaviourally-focused policies in their current form do not take account 
5 Such ideological and practical influences “are not insignificant and currently include a resurgence of… 
positive reinforcement and/or suggestion to influence behaviour” (p. 159).
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of the complicated reality of the decisions that most people face [61]. There is also 
a concern that nudges provide at best a smokescreen for governmental inaction, and 
at worst a marketing ploy in concert with industry actors [11, 48, 53, 61]. Regard-
ing social determinants, Bonell and colleagues argue that the UK government’s pro-
motion of nudging as an alternative to ‘hard’ policy interventions misrepresents the 
original theory behind nudging (as one of a suite of regulatory tools). Misleading 
the public about the nature of nudges “serves to obscure the government’s failure to 
propose realistic actions to address the upstream socioeconomic and environmen-
tal determinants of disease” [11]. A related, but deeper, issue with the emphasis on 
nudge-type initiatives is that public health is reduced to the ‘managerial’ [45]. Lang 
and Rayner surmise that the increasingly technical language of policy ‘delivery’, and 
now the micro-level focus on nudging individuals, frames thought around health and 
well-being in such a way that it discourages public health attention on the “macro, 
big picture, framing contexts of life” [45]. Nudge, for them, is the current fad within 
the general trend towards a managerial and reductionist approach to public health, 
which ultimately threatens to make public health irrelevant [45].
(In)equality and Social (In)justice I: Methodological and Empirical 
Concerns
As we have just seen, the behavioural science and social determinants of health lit-
eratures are to a large extent disconnected. This is concerning because, by not taking 
account of the social and other macro determinants of health, policies which draw 
on the behavioural sciences will continue to have an overly narrow and individualis-
tic focus. They will fail to make any real headway in tackling the root causes of ill-
health and health inequalities. There are a number of methodological and empirical 
concerns regarding the behavioural sciences which have the potential to compound 
this problem. While policy-oriented behavioural scientists seem aware of some of 
the limitations of their research [66], and have recently outlined a number of issues 
regarding the replicability or generalisability of their findings, concerns remain 
which need to be addressed if behavioural science- inspired policy is to make any 
real headway in public health. The first of these concerns the evidence-base for the 
use of behavioural insights in public health law and policy. The second concerns 
the effectiveness of potential behavioural science interventions in the public health 
arena in general.
Behavioural Law and Policy: Problems of Translation
Translating behavioural sciences research into law and policy is not necessarily 
straightforward. In particular, there are empirical and methodological limits which 
may lead to existing inequalities being perpetuated or exacerbated. One difficulty is 
that much initial research in the behavioural sciences is carried out in laboratory-like 
conditions on populations which have been described as WEIRD; that is, it is con-
ducted on research participants who are Western, Educated, and from Industrialized, 
388 Health Care Anal (2018) 26:380–397
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Rich, and Democratic countries [40]. The difficulty with this is that such groups are 
commonly treated as if they are representative of populations more generally or the 
intended target group for a real-world intervention. This, however, ought not to be 
assumed. Henrich and colleagues conducted a review of large-scale studies which 
involved comparative experiments on behavioural variables. In this review, they 
made four comparisons: (1) industrialised societies versus small-scale societies; (2) 
western versus non-western societies; (3) contemporary Americans versus the rest 
of the West; (4) typical contemporary American subjects versus other Americans. 
They concluded that, rather than WEIRD research participants being representative, 
they are outliers across multiple dimensions. Consider just two findings. In compar-
ing differences within Western populations, they found that Americans have a more 
individualistic self-concept that other Western countries, valuing independence and 
choice to a higher degree [40]. And in making comparisons between different types 
of American subjects, they found that undergraduate student test-subjects displayed 
more prosocial tendencies than older adults. They displayed higher levels of “trust, 
fairness, cooperation, and punishment of unfairness or free-riding” in experimental 
measures of these [40].
Hence, whilst a substantial portion of behavioural studies involve WEIRD popu-
lations, these are biased population samples. As Henrich and colleagues put it:
Sampling from a thin slice of humanity would be less problematic if research-
ers confined their interpretations to the populations from which they sampled. 
However, despite their narrow samples, behavioral scientists often are inter-
ested in drawing inferences about the human mind and human behavior. This 
inferential step is rarely challenged or defended… despite the lack of any gen-
eral effort to assess how well results from WEIRD samples generalize to the 
species [40].
In short, biased samples produce biased data. When this happens, we risk getting 
non-representative, non-diverse, non-generalisable results, something which is even 
more problematic when imported into law and policy. But, even if WEIRD popu-
lations were representative of the cognitive biases displayed by populations gener-
ally (e.g. the UK population), this is not a guarantee that they are representative of 
particular target populations for particular interventions (e.g. women aged 30–40, 
who are living in poverty in the North East of England). Moreover, some of what 
is termed ‘cognitive bias’ may have social and cultural elements [67]. The conse-
quence of all this might be that the desired effect of the behavioural science-inspired 
policy may not work in practice when transplanted to different populations. This 
is something which may be particularly significant given the heterogeneous demo-
graphics amongst, for instance, EU member states, economically, socially, politi-
cally, and so on6 [60].
Leaving the issue of WEIRD populations aside, there are other problems with 
the use of these laboratory-type experiments. Much of the relevant research is 
done in controlled laboratory-like settings, and can include ‘game play’ research 
6 Though these problems may be avoided as interventions develop. See Ref. [66].
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methods (e.g. ultimatum bargaining, public goods games, and prisoner’s dilem-
mas) where there are no real-life costs or benefits associated with them [8, 9, 
12, 15]. These experiments are designed with specific parameters and controls. 
Therefore, they may not capture the complexity of the real-world environment or 
the day-to-day reality of human behaviour.
The difficulties with the experimental studies are compounded by the fact 
that there is a lack of robust empirical evidence from applied settings that can 
point to whether or not the findings of such research translate well outside of 
the experimental context. One solution to this, which the BIT advocates, is the 
use of RCTs. These studies involve testing interventions by randomly allocating 
test subjects to the interventions. There is also a control group which does not 
receive an intervention (or receives the currently best available one for compari-
son). Conducting RCTs certainly represents an improvement over not doing any 
applied studies for behavioural interventions. However, there are at least three dif-
ficulties with these. First, we do not yet have many studies of this kind which test 
public health-related interventions. Second, even where such studies have been 
conducted, these have been over a short timescale. As such, there are questions 
about the long-term effects of interventions within complex real-work settings. 
As members of the BIT have recently noted, “[o]ne underlying issue is that pub-
lic officials and academics (particularly junior scholars) are rarely incentivised to 
choose studies where the main outcome measure will only be reported far in the 
future” [66]. Third, there are questions of applicability. In a similar to manner to 
experimental studies, the results of RCTs conducted in a particular place under 
particular conditions do not necessarily or automatically apply to other places 
with different conditions [16, 22, 30].
Finally, of those RCTs that have been conducted, the persuasiveness of the evi-
dence is sometimes questionable. Take, for instance, an RCT on smoking cessation 
conducted by the BIT for Public Health England (PHE). The BIT tested the use of 
different messages and images on a website aimed at encouraging people to stop 
smoking [6]. According to a PHE report, this trial “found that website design and 
time of visit affected registrations by up to 5.9 percentage points and the optimal 
registration page included no picture, a testimonial and a health benefits message” 
[57]. Moreover, the trial resulted in 2040 more registrations to the smoking cessa-
tion programme [57]. The problem with this is twofold. First, an interrogation of the 
graph of the different interventions trialled shows that the actual difference between 
the control and the most effective intervention looks to be less than one percent-
age point. This does not appear to be particularly efficacious. Second, the measured 
outcome was registrations to the smoking cessation programme, not actual smoking 
cessation. Therefore, if just over 2000 people registered, then we can expect signifi-
cantly fewer to have stuck with the programme and quit. Again this does not seem 
to be particularly effective, especially given that 345,920 webpage landings were 
recorded during the trial.
In sum, the supposed evidence behind proposed behavioural science-informed 
health law and policy initiatives is at times limited both in terms of how much evi-
dence supports the research findings, and in terms of how well the findings apply to 
new contexts.
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Individual Incremental Gains or Across the Board Regulation?
One response to the above critique is to say that some health benefits are better than 
none, and that we ought to use behavioural science in law and policy where such 
gains can be made. So, in relation to the smoking trial, we might say that at least 
some people will have stopped smoking and this is a good thing in relation to harm 
reduction and their health. Indeed, some version of this argument seems to be at 
work for proponents of these new behavioural science-informed approaches. For 
example, Hallsworth contends that public health measures should focus on interven-
tions which can give progressive marginal gains and harness our more automatic, 
habitual behaviours [38]. We do not want to suggest that marginal gains might not 
lead to some change, especially when compounded over time. However, individual 
incremental gains are highly inconsistent—as uptake varies between individuals—
and may not be enough to effect large-scale change, either quickly enough or in a 
cost-effective manner. They also may not be taken up by the individuals most in 
need of public health interventions [3]. More may be needed, such as regulation on 
upstream health factors. To illustrate, let us consider two such examples: trans fats 
and sugar.
Trans fats are a food additive that industry has been using for over a century to 
lengthen the shelf-life, improve palatability, and stabilise for deep-frying a num-
ber of processed foods [14]. These fats are also closely associated with increases 
in the incidence of high levels of ‘bad’ cholesterol (low-density lipoprotein) in the 
blood, and increased risk of cardiovascular disease [14, 62]. There is accumulat-
ing evidence that people with less money, less education, insecure employment and 
poor housing conditions are more likely to experience food insecurity, eat unhealthy 
diets, and have higher levels of dietary-related diseases than are other groups [32]. 
People in the lowest socio-economic range are more likely than people at higher 
socio-economic levels to have to rely on processed foods for a larger portion of their 
diet, and thus are more likely to consume greater quantities of and experience the 
negative effects of trans fats on their health [14, 62, 78]. However, this is a para-
digmatic example of how failures in the food supply that most affect the worst-off 
have effects on all members of a society. Everyone who eats processed foods will 
experience the negative health effects of trans fats to some degree. This includes 
the best-off in society. Removing trans fats from the food supply increases equity by 
protecting the health of those who must rely on processed foods more often, while 
promoting the health of everyone, and improving the overall health of the entire 
community. Given this, bans on trans-fats in foods have been introduced in numer-
ous jurisdictions [29, 31, 39]. This is an example of a population-level regulatory 
change, not an individual-level change, which improves the health of everyone, but 
especially those who are worse-off in society. Approaching trans fats via regulatory 
change is sensitive to the social determinants of health, and is a more comprehensive 
approach to this particular food ingredient, than ‘nudging’ individuals to stop choos-
ing processed foods.
With regards to sugar, Public Health England (PHE) has recently published 
guidelines for the food industry restricting the amount of sugar added to food in the 
United Kingdom [58]. The food categories covered by the guidelines include the 
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likely suspects, such as ice cream and cake which one would expect to contain sugar, 
but also some possibly surprising candidates such as breakfast cereals and yoghurts 
[58]. In North America, the Centre for Science in the Public Interest reports that 
sugar is added to upwards of 80% of processed foods [43]. Additionally, there is now 
some evidence that sugar has negative impact on the body’s metabolic functioning 
[58]. Given that processed foods covered by a trans fats ban also contain high levels 
of sugar, and that the social groups more likely to rely on processed foods face the 
brunt of the corresponding negative health impacts, regulations on sugar similar to 
those regarding trans fats may be called for, and may have similar equity-improving 
effects. The high levels of sodium currently added to processed and restaurant foods 
represents yet another area where regulation would be appropriate, and would have 
important health and equity effects [43, 48].
This is not to say that insights from the behavioural sciences have no place in 
public health policy. Consider, for example, Warin et al.’s report on empirical work 
in South Australia. The team of researchers found that individuals of low socio-
economic status experience ‘shortened horizons’, and do not conceptualise health or 
‘the future’ in the way that public health and policy-makers typically do [77]. This 
group of people focus their mental, physical, and financial resources on coping with 
present needs, so the notions of protecting health for a future time, or investing in 
one’s health, are less present in their lived experiences. Thus, most forward-look-
ing public health messages are not effective on or sensitive to this group of people 
[77]. This research has interesting implications for the use of interventions based on 
behavioural science. In particular, it suggests that nudges in the context of imme-
diate choices could be more effective interventions than education or social mar-
keting for certain groups in certain environments. This is not (just) because they 
manipulate sub-consciously, but because they meet this group of decision-makers 
within their operative and prioritised set of concerns. Having said that, this applica-
tion of nudges does not address the deeper problems that this group faces, in terms 
of employment, income, housing, education, or other social determinants. In this 
regard, regulatory changes, such as banning trans fats from processed foods, or lim-
iting the amount of additive sugars, promote the health of the population without 
requiring that individuals in this group (or any group) actively commit to changing 
their behaviour, thus avoiding extra psychological burdens. What this shows is that 
there is a range of daily life in which behavioural science can help us to address cer-
tain proximal influences on health, but it must work in cooperation with regulatory 
measures that address the distal social determinants of health.
In advocating these regulatory and population-level measures, an important ques-
tion arises regarding the role and function of public health (policy). Our argument 
below is that an equitable and justifiable public health aims at more than individual-
ised interventions targeting the usual public health suspects.
(In)equality and Social (In)justice II: What Kind of Public Health?
A common interpretation of public health is that it is a branch of the state that acts 
to protect communities from infectious diseases. This focus can justify interventions 
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that restrict individual liberty based on the risk of harm to others, and permit the 
legitimate use of various state powers, including quarantine, in order to limit com-
municable disease outbreaks [21, 55]. This way of conceptualising public health 
may work well for infectious disease or cases (like smoking) where collateral harm 
to others from the individual’s choice can be clearly established. In order to protect 
other people from harms, public health may exercise state powers and interfere with 
individual liberty with some level of legitimacy. This is typically the case in public 
health measures focused on communicable disease. However, this way of conceptu-
alising public health poses challenges when public health is called upon to intervene 
to address non-communicable diseases. In cases of non-communicable disease, as 
well as diseases where there is not a clear link of collateral harms to others, pub-
lic health interventions that involve some restriction upon people’s liberty (even 
when small) may not be as easy to justify on this model of public health action. 
Since people’s failures to undertake public health measures regarding, for example, 
food choices do not clearly put the health of other people at risk, public health may 
be limited in the kinds of ‘liberty-restricting’ policies that they may (legitimately) 
introduce.
However, what counts as restricting liberty in an unjustified manner is a matter 
of perspective and debate. On some liberal views, there seems to be a low toler-
ance for measures like governing portion sizes of foods, or penalties (in the form 
of taxes). On such views many public health initiatives have been labelled ‘nanny’ 
interventions (often after the lobbying and media efforts of food companies). Here, 
‘traditional’ public health interventions, such as those addressing sanitation or viral 
outbreaks, are seen as more legitimate spheres of action for the state. Communicable 
diseases are viewed either as potential harms to others or as failures of important 
community systems/infrastructure (that could provide protection from such dis-
eases) [52, 65]. Interventions to prevent these can be contrasted with public health 
interventions regarding the ‘usual suspects’. These are perceived, on such views, 
as addressing individual choice as opposed to communicable or other disease vec-
tors. Where public health is framed in this manner, there is a justificatory dilemma. 
People’s failures to undertake public health measures addressing things like dietary 
choices may not justify public health interventions that restrict people’s liberty [1, 
49, 65]. Yet, focusing too much on individual liberty may actually have a negative 
impact on the health of the public, and so should not be taken as granted [20].
What is often missing from more individual liberty-focused accounts of public 
health is the recognition that some non-communicable diseases are causally con-
nected to the SDoH. As such, there are a range of causal factors which are largely 
out of the individual’s control [34]. As mentioned previously, there is wide recog-
nition and agreement that the social determinants of health, including education, 
employment, housing, and food security, all contribute to a person’s health state 
[68]. A person’s ability to make individual health-protective choices is determined 
to a great degree by these factors, and public health interventions that do not attend 
to this may miss their target group or inadvertently deepen inequities [17, 77].
An alternative and, some have argued, more appropriate perspective views public 
health’s purpose as achieving and supporting the necessary conditions for justice and 
health equity [49, 55]. This interpretation permits a focus on the social determinants, 
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and highlights the need for regulatory change in order to address many contribu-
tors to poor health. Attention to this is not necessarily at odds with the tactics of 
behavioural science, but is a crucial counterpart to any nudge-based intervention in 
choice architecture [10, 70]. A model of public health which places the social and 
other determinants of health at its centre would seek to address the distributional 
failures at the source of non-communicable disease. This would move the emphasis 
away from individual responsibility, as well as away from long-standing anxieties 
about personal liberty and worries about (unjustified) interference with individual 
choices about self-regarding health behaviours [1, 54]. It would concentrate on sys-
temic and distributional problems, rather than making health issues the sole domain 
of the individual [55]. Given this, if the achievement of a base level of human well-
being for the population is the goal of a system of public health, then the largely 
individual-focused approach of behavioural science-based public health policy as it 
currently stands may not be fit for purpose.
Concluding Remarks: Mitigating Inequalities and Addressing 
Determinants
In the extensive and ever-burgeoning literature on behavioural science, libertar-
ian paternalism, and nudges, very little seems to engage directly with the SDoH. 
Although commentators discuss the appropriateness of nudges and behavioural sci-
ence to address individual behaviour change (on ethical, legal, or policy terms), the 
social determinants of health are often only mentioned in passing. There is a real and 
present danger that the influence of behavioural science and libertarian paternalism 
in recent years has undermined the earlier consensus on the need for an ‘ecological’ 
approach to health. The benefit of this approach was that it placed the individual 
factors involved in ill health behind the structural and socially-determined factors. 
Solutions addressing the social factors would have perhaps gained more attention 
if this model had maintained or gained influence. Instead considerations of the way 
that findings in behavioural science do or do not intersect with knowledge about the 
social determinants of health seem to have been largely neglected.
At least on the face of it, the intellectual approach in the behavioural sciences 
represents a welcome change from the questionable assumptions about rationality 
and decision-making which have been embedded in more traditional approaches to 
law and policy. By focusing on the contextual factors affecting decision-making, 
they hold the potential to increase the effectiveness of policy and regulatory inter-
ventions. That said, there is a great need not to allow our policy-makers to become 
blinded by nudge-type interventions addressing the proximal influences on health, 
at the expense of the many distal influences. Addressing the social determinants is 
essential to making any long-term progress on ill-health, specifically when consid-
ering certain non-communicable diseases. This seems especially relevant given the 
on-going concerns about the quality of evidence supporting certain behavioural sci-
ence interventions, as even behavioural scientists themselves admit [66]. We ought 
to bring the application of behavioural science closer to the idea that seems part 
of its origin: that behavioural science may help regulation work better, but cannot 
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replace regulation entirely [72]. In theory, experimentation in behavioural science 
could be improved by using groups that are more representative and diverse, or at 
least more similar to the target group for a given intervention, and by broadening 
the range of what counts as good evidence. Behavioural science could, in theory, 
also be used in a way that supplements regulation which tackles systemic issues, or 
takes account of the social determinants of health, or helps to tackle the root causes 
of ill-health and health inequalities. Of course, whether these happen in practice is 
a matter of ethics, of continuing to emphasise the importance of systemic issues to 
everyone’s health, and of political will.
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